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IN RE GAGER AND THE COMMISSION TO STUDY 
PROBLEMS OF ILLEGITIMACY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In In re Cager,! decided in 1968, the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land reversed a Circuit Court for Prince George's County's ruling 
that children living in homes with illegitimate siblings were "ne-
glected" within the meaning of Article 26, Section 52(f) of the Ma-
ryland Code.2 The circuit court ruling addressed three consolidated 
cases concerning unwed women, each of whom gave birth to con-
secutive illegitimate children.3 
The court of appeals held that the circuit court misconstrued 
the statute at issue in Cager.4 The court of appeals reversed the cir-
cuit court's holding that permitted the state to consider successive 
illegitimate births as independently sufficient grounds for deeming 
a child neglected.5 The court also held that, in light of then-recent 
Supreme Court precedent, federal requirements concerning termi-
nation of benefits eligibility under the Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children program (AFDC)6 rendered the actions taken by 
Prince George's County unlawfuP Further, the court held that the 
state's action was invalid because the Prince George's County State's 
Attorney had wrongfully used information gleaned from AFDC ap-
plications to initiate proceedings under Section 52(f).8 
1. 251 Md. 473, 248 A.2d 384 (1968). 
2. See id. at 478, 248 A.2d at 387. See generally MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 52(f) 
(1966) (repealed 1969) (defining the term "neglected child"), quoted in Gager, 
251 Md. at 476 n.1, 479, 248 A.2d at 386 n.1, 388. See infra note 21 for the 
text of Section 52(f). 
3. See Gager, 251 Md. at 477 n.2, 501-02, 248 A.2d at 387 n.2, 400-01; see also infra 
note 21 (providing text of the statute). 
4. See Gager, 251 Md. at 479, 248 A.2d at 388. 
5. See Gager, 251 Md. at 480, 248 A.2d at 388. 
6. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1994); Gager, 251 Md. at 480,248 A.2d at 388-89 
(citing King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), and Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 
(1968». See infra notes 49-105 and accompanying text for an in-depth discus-
sion of the Gager court's application of King arid Levy. 
7. See Gager, 251 Md. at 480, 248 A.2d at 389. 
8. See id. at 481-83, 248 A.2d at 389-90. 
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This Comment will revisit the Gager decision and argue that the 
case was wrongly decided for several reasons. Specifically, the statute 
at issue in Gager,9 which was an outgrowth of recommendations by 
the Commission to Study Problems of Illegitimacy among Recipients 
of Public Welfare Monies in the Program for Aid to Dependent 
Children (the Commission), unambiguously authorized the chal-
lenged actions taken by the State. 1O Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court cases relied upon by the court of appeals did not support the 
propositions for which they were cited. ll Additionally, the State's At-
torney's reliance on information taken from AFDC applications was 
consonant with the goals and structure of that program and all fed-
eral and state regulations applicable at the time. 12 
This Comment concludes that the egregious misconstruction of 
the authority relied on by the Gager majority invites speculation as 
to whether the court's goal was to confound the clear intent of the 
legislature regarding "serial illegitimacy."13 Gager appears to be a 
product of a then-emerging trend concerning public assistance and 
family structure. 14 The emerging trend was towards a more liberal 
acceptance of non-traditional family structures and long-term reli-
ance on public assistance. 15 
In contrast, Judge Barnes's powerful dissent urged in Gager con-
formed with more traditional views concerning public assistance, il-
9. See id. at 476 n.1, 248 A.2d at 386 n.1. See generally REpORT OF THE COMMISSION 
TO STUDY PROBLEMS OF ILLEGITIMACY AMONG THE RECIPIENTS OF PUBUC WELFARE 
MONIES IN THE PROGRAM FOR AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN (1961) [hereinafter 
COMMISSION REpORT]. The Commission was convened by Governor]. Millard 
Tawes at the behest of the Maryland General Assembly in 1961. See COMMIS-
SION REpORT, supra, at 4. It consisted of sixteen members. See id. at 11. 
10. See, e.g., COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 9, at 24-25, 27-28 (discussing Recom-
mendations Two and Seven). 
11. See infra notes 46-109 and accompanying text. 
12. See Cager, 251 Md. at 501-02,248 A.2d at 400-01 (Barnes,]., dissenting). 
13. The term "serial illegitimacy" is used to describe unwed women bearing two 
or more children. 
14. See generally Loren Miller, Race, Poverty and the Law, 54 CAL. L. REv. 386 (1966) 
(discussing constitutional implications of poverty and the law); Robert M. 
O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CAL. 
L. REv. 443, 456-78 (1966) (discussing the evolution of the legal concept that 
placing conditions on receipt of welfare can have constitutional implications); 
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733 (1964) (discussing the 
emergence of the government in private and societal interests). 
15. See generally WINIFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDANT CHILDREN (1965). Assistance to 
single mothers had historically been conditioned on strict notions of moral fit-
ness. See id. at 7, 29-30. 
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legitimacy, and family structure. 16 Similar values guided the Com-
mission in its work, and the Commission's Report provided much of 
the basis for Judge Barnes's dissent. 17 
The issues addressed by the Commission and the Cager court 
remain at the forefront of public debate. Today, politicians, political 
activists, and pundits fiercely contest whether a causal relationship 
exists between welfare policies and the rise in illegitimacy over the 
past several decades. IS A related issue concerns the claimed link be-
tween illegitimacy and several social problems.19 
This Comment will analyze the Cager court's rationale and ex-
amine the Commission's Report. Additionally, it will update core 
data presented in the report and look at additional related data, 
providing a look at a social transformation since the Cager decision. 
Finally, this Comment will identify the larger implications of the 
Cager holding, discussing both the proper role of the judiciary and 
the appropriate source of authority on matters of public policy. 
II. IN RE GAGER 
A. The Trial Court Ruling 
In In re Cager, the court of appeals addressed a Circuit Court 
for Prince George's County ruling20 that a child living in a home 
with one or more illegitimate siblings was neglected within the 
meaning of Article 26, Section 52(f) of the Maryland Code.21 The 
16. See Gager, 251 Md. at 499, 248 A.2d at 399; see also COMMISSION REpORT, supra 
note 9, at 17-18. 
17. See infra notes 162-93 and accompanying text. 
18. See JARED TA\LOR, PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS: THE FAILURE OF RACE RElA-
TIONS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 301-D5 (1992) ("Over the tragedy of the un-
derclass, the welfare system casts a long, dark shadow."); see also CHARLES MUR-
RAY, LOSING GROUND 162-66 (1984) (showing empirical correlation between the 
growth in AFDC spending and liberalization of welfare rules with a dramatic 
rise in illegitimacy rates among the population receiving benefits). But see Pe-
ter B. Edelman, Toward a Gomprehensive Antipoverty Strategy: Getting Beyond The 
Silver Bullet, 81 GEO. LJ. 1697, 1707 (1993) (discussing the diversity of recipi-
ents receiving welfare); Dorothy Roberts, Exploding the Myths Behind New Jersey 
Welfare Reform, NJ. LJ., Jan. 25, 1993, at 21 ("[Nlumerous studies have found 
no causal relationship between welfare and family size."); Robert Samuelson, 
... Essential to the Debate, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1993, at A19 ("The idea that 
girls have babies to get welfare checks is absurd."). 
19. See infra notes 232-34 and accompanying text. 
20. Circuit Court Judge Bowen presided at the trial. See Gager, 251 Md. at 477,248 
A.2d at 287. 
21. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 52(f) (1966) (repealed 1969), quoted in Gager, 251 
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circuit court ruling resolved the cases of three unmarried women, 
each of whom had borne successive children out of wedlock.22 
Judge Bowen ordered the children removed from their homes 
and placed in foster care upon finding that the minors were ne-
glected children within the meaning of Section 52(f).23 Judge 
Bowen based his ruling on criterion24 six of Section 52(f), which 
concerns children living in a home which "fails to provide a stable 
Md. at 477 n.l, 248 A.2d at 387 n.1. Section 52(£) defined the term "neglected 
child" as a child: 
(1) who is without proper guardianship; 
(2) whose parent, guardian or person with whom the child lives, by 
reason of cruelty, mental incapacity, immorality or depravity, is unfit 
to care properly for such a child; 
(3) who is under unlawful or improper care, supervision, custody or 
restraint, by any person, corporation, agency, association, institution 
or other organization or who is unlawfully kept out of school; 
(4) whose parent, guardian or custodian neglects or refuses, when 
able to do so, to provide necessary medical, surgical, institutional or 
hospital care for such child; 
(5) who is in such condition of want or suffering, or is under such 
improper guardianship or control, or is engaged in such occupation 
as to injure or endanger the morals or health of himself or others; 
or 
(6) who is living in a home which fails to provide a stable moral envi-
ronment. In determining whether such stable moral environment ex-
ists, the court shall consider, among other things, whether the par-
ent, guardian, or person with whom the child lives 
(i) Is unable to provide such an environment by reason of im-
maturity, or emotional, mental or physical disability; 
(ii) Is engaging in promiscuous conduct inside or outside the 
home; 
(iii) Is cohabiting with a person to whom he or she is not 
married; 
(iv) Is pregnant with an illegitimate child; or 
(v) Has, within a period of twelve months preceding the filing 
of the petition alleging the child to be neglected, either been 
pregnant with or given birth to another child to whose putative 
father she was not legally married at the time of conception, or 
has not thereafter married. 
MD. ANN: CODE art. 26, §52(£) (1966) (repealed 1969). 
22. See Gager, 251 Md. at 478 n.2, 248 A.2d at 387 n.2. 
23. See id. at 476-77, 248 A.2d at 386-88. 
24. For purposes of this article, Sections 56(£)(1) through 56(£)(6) will be herein-
after referred to as criteria one through six; Sections 56(£) (5) (i) through 
56(£) (5) (v) referred to as sub-criteria one through five. See generally supra note 
21 (providing full text of Section 56(£). 
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moral environment."25 
In determining whether a home provides a "stable moral envi-
ronment," the legislature prescribed five sub-criteria that a court 
should consider, including whether the parent or guardian with 
whom a child lives "[i] s pregnant with an illegitimate child; or 
[has,] within a period of twelve months preceding the filing of the 
petition alleging [neglect,] ... been pregnant with or given birth to 
another child to whose putative father she was not legally mar-
ried . . . or has not thereafter married. "26 
Judge Bowen anticipated that resolution of the cases would 
have important implications. He described the cases before him as 
"test cases" that would "determine whether ... [s]tate law furnishes 
a vehicle to assist in the control of the problem of illegitimacy, its 
mounting costs to the taxpayers, and its mounting costs in human 
misery and suffering."27 Proceeding on a record of stipulated facts, 
the judge ruled in favor of the county.28 He held that bearing more 
than one illegitimate child was alone sufficient to support a finding 
that a child was neglected and living in "an unstable moral environ-
ment" within the meaning of Section 52(f) (6) .29 
Represented by attorneys ad litem, the unwed mothers filed suit 
challenging the county's application of Section 52(f).30 The mothers 
25: [d. at 477 n.l, 248 A.2d at 386 n.l (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 52(f) (6) 
(1966) (repealed 1969». 
26. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 52(f)(6)(iv)-(v) (1966) (repealed 1969). See supra 
note 21 for full text of Section 52(f). 
27. Cager, 251 Md. at 477, 248 A.2d at 387. 
28. See id. at 477 n.2, 248 A.2d at 387 n.2. The parties stipulated that the children 
were illegitimate. See id. In his dissent, Judge Bames observed that the use of 
information from a mother's AFDC application to initiate neglect proceedings 
was not properly before the court and should not have been addressed by the 
majority. See id. at 502, 248 A.2d at 401 (Bames,]., dissenting). 
29. [d. at 478, 248 A.2d at 387. In the circuit court, Judge Bowen had little diffi-
culty concluding that such an environment "relaters] or [was] intended to re-
late to a situation where a mother has had a series of illegitimate children 
[as] .... in these cases," and he asserted that" [m]ost first illegitimate chil-
dren ... are the result of mistakes." [d. Judge Bowen continued, "The second 
time around ... demonstrates an unstable moral attitude ... that is inconsis-
tent with the minimum moral standard the community requires." [d. Likewise, 
the dissenting judge on the court of appeals further opined "that by . . . en-
gaging in sexual relations with men, that produce illegitimate children, [a sin-
gle woman] has demonstrated in the most forceful and irrefutable way that 
she either does not care for the views of society . . . or ... is unable to con-
form." [d. at 498, 248 A.2d at 398-99 (Bames,]. dissenting). 
30. See Cager, 251 Md. at 476-77, 248 A.2d at 386-87. 
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specifically challenged the circuit court's conclusion that multiple il-
legitimate births, standing alone, was sufficient grounds to deem 
their children neglected under the statute.31 
B. The Court of Appeals opinion 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the circuit court32 
and held that an illegitimate child may not be found neglected 
under Section 52 (f) based solely upon the fact that the child lives 
with illegitimate siblings.33 The court's holding was based on its in-
terpretation of the phrase "among other things," preceding the five 
sub-criteria specified at Section 52(f) (6),34 which a court must con-
sider in determining whether a child is in a stable moral environ-
ment.35 The court concluded that the "other things" to be consid-
ered include the preceding five primary criteria, in addition to the 
five sub-criteria.36 Thus, the court of appeals held that a "fail[ure] 
to provide a stable moral environment" under criterion six could 
not be established solely upon a showing of the presence of one or 
two of the sub-criteriaY The majority held that criterion one 
through five were as essential to discerning a "stable moral environ-
ment" as the five sub-criteria prescribed in criterion Six.38 The court 
also found that there was nothing explicit in Section 52(f) to sug-
gest that the mere presence of more than one illegitimate child 
was, . by itself, sufficient grounds for a finding of neglect, and that 
such a reading could not be reasonably inferred as within the 
meaning of Section 52(f) .39 
Analyzing criteria one through five, the court discerned that 
the underlying purposes of the statute were to prevent "unlawful or 
31. See id. at 478, 248 A.2d at 387. On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land, amicus briefs arguing in favor of the mothers were filed by Planned 
Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., Planned Parenthood Association of 
Maryland, Inc., Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, D.C., Inc., 
and the Washington Chapter of the Medical Committee for Human Rights. See 
id. at 477, 248 A.2d at 387. 
32. See id. at 486, 248 A.2d at 392. 
33. Id. at 478, 248 A.2d at 387. 
34. See supra notes 21, 24 (providing full text of Section 52(£) and explaining cate-
gorizing of criteria and sub-criteria, respectively). 
35. eager, 251 Md. at 479, 248 A.2d at 388 (quoting MD. ANN CODE art. 26, 
§ 52(£)(6) (1966) (repealed 1969». 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. See id. 
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improper care, supervision or restraint" of children, and to provide 
a lawful basis for state intervention when there has been a failure by 
a parent or custodian to provide proper care or make adequate 
provisions for a child.40 Such factors, the court held, must be con-
sidered prior to any valid finding of neglect under Section 52(f) .41 
The court of appeals also noted that the state has parens pa-
tria(P authority, and that the provisions of Article 26 concerning 
juveniles must be utilized in a manner consistent with the objective 
of child protection, which is integral to that authority.43 The ulti-
mate standard to be used in determining child custody questions is 
"the best interest of the child," which mayor may not be served by 
removing a child from a home in instances of consecutive illegiti-
mate childbearing.44 The court also based its holding on its under-
standing of the AFDC program requirements as administered by the 
states, particularly in light of recent Supreme Court rulings con-
cerning the legal status of illegitimate children and the scope of 
state discretion regarding administration of the AFDC program.45 
The court first cited Levy v. Louisiancf6 as comparative authority for 
the proposition that the illegitimacy of a child or a child's siblings 
cannot serve as the sole measure of either a child's best interests or 
the suitability of a particular home.47 
Levy concerned the right of illegitimate children to bring a civil 
action under Louisiana's wrongful death statute.48 The statute pro-
40. Id. at 478-79, 248 A.2d at 387-88. 
41. See id. at 478, 248 A.2d at 387-88. 
42. See id. at 480, 248 A.2d at 388 (quoting Ex Parte Cromwell, 232 Md. 305, 308, 
192 A.2d 775, 777 (1963». Literally, parens patriae means "parent of the coun-
try." BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). This common law doctrine 
stands for the proposition that the sovereign has both the right and duty to 
act as guardian of minors and others critically lacking capacity, such as the in-
sane. See id. 
43. See Cager, 251 Md. at 480, 248 A.2d at 388. 
44. Id. at 479-80, 248 A.2d at 388. Evaluating a child's best interests is an inherent 
equitable power of the court. See, e.g., Beckman v. Boggs, 337 Md. 688, 655 
A.2d 901 (1995) (determining visitation rights of grandparents); Evans v. Ev-
ans, 302 Md. 334, 488 A.2d 157 (1985) (awarding visitation rights to non-
adoptive stepmother); Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119,372 A.2d 1231 (1977) (hold-
ing that an equity court's determinations concerning a child's best interests 
may be disturbed only on grounds of a clear abuse of discretion). 
45. See Cager, 251 Md. at 480, 248 A.2d at 388-89; see also infra notes 47-89 and ac-
companying text. 
46. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
47. See Cager, 251 Md. at 480, 248 A.2d at 388. 
48. See Levy, 391 U.S. at 69. 
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vided that such suits could be brought by various relatives of a de-
ceased, including the decedent's children.49 The Louisiana Court of 
Appeals upheld a dismissal of an action seeking recovery under the 
statute by a trial court50 which held that the term "children" only 
included legitimate children.51 The Louisiana Supreme Court de-
nied certiorari.52 
The United States Supreme Court held that the statute, as con-
strued by Louisiana's courts, was invalid under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.53 The Court found that the 
purpose of providing children with standing under the wrongful 
death statute was to provide an avenue for compensation of all who 
had benefitted from an "intimate, familial relationship between a 
child and ... [a parent]. "54 The statute's purpose was frustrated by 
placing illegitimate children into a separate category of persons 
who, although they may have equally benefitted from such a rela-
tionship, were nonetheless not entitled to bring suit.55 Moreover, 
the Court held that there were no redeeming rationales for such an 
exclusion.56 It rejected both of Louisiana's public policy arguments 
in defense of the State's construction of the statuteY Therefore, the 
classification was held not "rational,"58 hence invidious59 and 
unconstitutional.60 
Even if one completely accepts the Levy holding,61 the decision 
49. See id. (citing LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West Supp. 1967) ("The right to 
recover ... shall survive for a period of one year ... in favor of: (1) the sur-
viving ... children of the deceased . . . [a] right to recover damages under 
the provisions of this paragraph is a property right which ... is inherited by 
[a decedent's] legal, instituted, or irregular heirs .... As used in this article, 
the [word] 'child' ... include[s] a child ... by adoption .... n». 
50. See Levy v. State, 192 So. 2d 193, 194 (La. Ct. App. 1966), reu'd, 391 U.S. 68 
(1968). 
51. See id. at 195. The court's decision was based in part on a finding that "morals 
and [the] general welfare" would be better preserved because the ruling 
would ostensibly have the effect of discouraging illegitimacy. [d. 
52. See Levy v. State, 193 So. 2d 530 (La. 1967), reu'd, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
53. See Levy, 391 U.S. at 71-72. 
54. [d. at 71. 
55. See id. at 71-72. 
56. See id. at 70-72. 
57. See id. Specifically, the State argued that its construction encouraged marriage 
and legitimization of children. See id. 
58. [d. at 71. 
59. See id. at 72. 
60. See id. at 71-72. 
61. [d. Justices Harlan, Black, and Stewart were critical of the majority holding. See 
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had no relevance to the issue in Gager. Gager was concerned with 
the grounds upon which the state, acting pursuant to its specific au-
thority to administer AFDC for the purpose of protecting children, 
determines whether a child is living in a morally unstable, neglect-
ful environment.62 A holding that illegitimate children of any age 
cannot be denied standing under a statutory cause of action has no 
bearing on the questions at issue in Gager.63 Furthermore, as dis-
cussed in more detail below in the context of King v. Smith,64 the 
facts of Gager concerned a series of state actions intended to provide 
better living conditions and material well-being to illegitimate 
children. 
The purpose of Section 52(f) was not to deny anything to ille-
gitimate children. If Section 52(f) denied anything, it was the expo-
sure of illegitimate children to home conditions that the legislature 
deemed harmful based on the findings and recommendations of 
the Commission.65 Indeed, the trial judge in Gager did not address 
the legal rights of illegitimate children as such.66 Rather, he ad-
dressed the authority of the state to act to protect the interests of 
putatively neglected minors.67 Instead of being denied a state bene-
fit or being discriminated against; the children in Gager were being 
id. at 72, 76-82 (Harlan, Black, & Stewart, JJ., dissenting) (dissenting in a sin-
gle dissent to the majority opinions in both Levy and Glona v. American Guar. 
& Liability Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968». Glona concerned an insurance claim 
for a deceased illegitimate child made pursuant to Louisiana's wrongful death 
statute. See Glona, 391 U.S. at 73-74. The dissenters argued that the majority 
had arbitrarily decreed that biological relation, rather than legal relation, was 
the proper basis for suit under the statute, asserting that such a notion is in-
consistent with the nature of wrongful death suits. See id. at 75-76. The dissent-
ers noted that such suits are inherently limited by the enabling statute's listing 
of proper plaintiffs, which historically have tended strongly to identify such 
plaintiffs in terms of legal, not biological relations. See id. at 76-79. 
62. See In re Cager, 251 Md. 473, 476-77, 248 A.2d 384, 386-87 (1968); see also supra 
note 21 (providing full text of Section 56(f». 
63. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
64. 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (holding that a state may not deny AFDC assistance to de-
pendent children based on a parents immorality or to prevent illegitimacy); 
see infra notes 73-109. 
65. See infra notes 170-83 and accompanying text. The Commission Report stated 
that the purpose of Recommendations Two and Seven, which were adopted al-
most verbatim by the legislature as Section 52(f), was to protect children from 
being harmed by surroundings of moral squalor. See COMMISSION REpORT, supra 
note 9, at 25, 28. 
66. See generally Gager, 251 Md. at 477-78, 248 A.2d at 387. 
67. See id. at 478, 248 A.2d at 387. 
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afforded an extraordinary measure of protection which, prior to the 
passage of Section 52(f), would have been unavailable to them.68 
The court of appeals utterly confused the matter by inferring 
that the issues in Levy and Gager were comparable. Logically, there 
is no parallel. In Levy, the Court's finding of invidious discrimina-
tion was based on an actual denial of a legal right-the right to 
bring a wrongful death action.69 On the other hand, the issue in 
Gager was not a denial of a state right or benefit in any sense,7° but 
an interpretation of a statute intended to protect children.71 There-
fore, while it may be unclear whether a child's best interests are in-
variably served by placing the child in foster care when there have 
been successive illegitimate births in the child's home, it is quite 
clear that Levy neither supports that conclusion nor addresses analo-
gous issues. 
In conjunction with Levy, the court of appeals also cited King v. 
Smith,72 which stands for the proposition that a state may not deny 
AFDC assistance to dependent children "on the basis of their 
mother's alleged immorality or to discourage illegitim[acy] ."73 King 
concerned the "man in the house" or "substitute father" regula-
tions, which had characterized state administration of AFDC plans 
throughout the history of the program.74 King arose from Alabama's 
denial of AFDC benefits to an unwed mother based on the determi-
nation that she had maintained regular '~cohabitation"75 in her 
home with a man.16 
68. Prior to the enactment of Section 52(f), the state did not have a means of re-
moving such children from a home environment determined to be neglectful. 
See infra notes 164-93 and accompanying text. 
69. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. 
70. The record did not disclose whether the children continued to receive AFDC 
benefits. See Cager, 251 Md. at 480,248 A.2d at 388-89. AFDC eligibility is based 
solely on the financial situation of the legal guardian of minor children. See 42 
U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (A)-(B) (1997). Whether the children would be deprived of 
AFDC benefits in their new homes would therefore depend on an indepen-
dent assessment of the neediness of the new home. See generally id. 
71. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. 
72. 392 U.S. 309 (1968). 
73. Cager, 251 Md. at 480, 248 A.2d at 388-89 (quoting King, 392 U.S. at 324). 
74. See BELL, supra note 15, at 7, 28. 
75. See King, 392 U.S. at 311. The term "cohabitation," as applied to the enforce-
ment of substitute father regulations, invariably referred to sexual intimacy. See 
BELL, supra note 15, at 98-99. See infra note 76 for the text of the Alabama 
regulation. . 
76. See King, 392 U.S. at 315. The Alabama regulation provided: 
[A]n able bodied man, married or single, is considered a substitute 
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The regulation challenged in King allowed the state to disqual-
ify families from receiving AFDC payments if the mother cohabits 
with a man.77 This result was achieved by defining a man as a pres-
ent, providing parent under circumstances where the man in ques-
tion was not legally obligated to support the children,78 not present 
in the home, or not supporting the children in fact.79 The regula-
tion was adopted to work in conjunction with AFDC eligibility re-
quirements.8o Since its inception, AFDC benefits were for children 
"deprived of parental support" due to a parent being "continually 
absent from the home."81 Under the Alabama regulation challenged 
in King and similar regulations in other states,82 a man cohabiting 
with a woman receiving AFDC assistance was designated a substitute 
parent or man in the house whose presence in the mother's life was 
determined to violate the statutory requirement that a parent be 
father of all the children of the applicant ... (1) if 'he lives in the 
home with the child's ... mother for the purpose of cohabitation'; 
or (2) if 'he visits [the home] frequently for the purpose of cohab:-
iting with the child's ... mother'; or (3) if 'he ... cohabits with the 
child's natural or adoptive mother elsewhere.' 
[d. at 313-14 (quoting Al.ABAMA MANuAL FOR ADMINISTRATION OF PUBUC AsSIS-
TANCE, pt. I, ch. II, § VI). 
Between 1964, when Alabama adopted the regulation, and 1967, the state 
experienced a 22% decline in AFDC children recipients (the number of chil-
dren receiving AFDC benefits). See id. at 315. 
77. See id. at 314. 
78. See id. at 327. 
79. See id. at 314 (quoting Al.ABAMA MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATION OF PuBuc AssIS-
TANCE, pt. I, ch. II, § VI (defining a man as a substitute parent». 
80. See id. at 313. 
81. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1994). This section provides: 
[d. 
The term "dependent child" means a needy child (1) who has been 
deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, contin-
ued absence from the home (other than absence occasioned solely 
by reason of the performance of active duty in the uniformed ser-
vices of the United States), or physical or mental incapacity of a par-
ent, and who is living with his father, mother, grandfather, grand-
mother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, 
stepsister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew, or niece, in a place of 
residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their 
own home, and (2) who is (A) under the age of eighteen, or (B) at 
the option of the State, under the age of nineteen and a full-time 
student in a secondary school (or in the equivalent level of voca-
tional or technical training). 
82. See BELL, supra note 15, at 76-81, 88. 
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continually absent from a home for a remaining parent to be eligi-
ble for AFDC.83 Thus, a finding that a substitute father was present 
would provide administrators with grounds for disqualifying the 
home from further AFDC benefits.84 
While the Supreme Court conceded that such state rules had 
been both permissible and commonplace throughout most of the 
program's history,85 the Court declared the Alabama rule invalid 
due to Congress's adoption of the "Flemming Ruling."86 The Flem-
ming Ruling, which was promulgated in 1961 by the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare, provided that "[a] state plan . . . 
may not impose an eligibility condition that would deny assistance 
with respect to a needy child on the basis that the home conditions 
in which the child lives are unsuitable, while the child continues to re-
side in the home."87 The ruling was subsequently enacted by statute, 
and incorporated into the Social Security ACt.88 
The issue in King, and the rationale for the Flemming Ruling 
upon which the King decision was based, was that to deny AFDC 
benefits to families without making alternate provisions for the wel-
fare of children who had been supported through the program 
would not be in the best interest of the child.89 The King decision 
83. See King, 392 U.S. at 314. 
84. See id. at 313. 
85. See id. at 321; see also BELL, supra note 15, at 76-92. 
86. See King, 392 U.S. at 325-26. The Flemming Ruling was named after Arthur F. 
Flemming, then Secretary of the United States Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare. See id. at 322. See generally BELL,_ supra note 15, at 147-51 (dis-
cussing the Flemming Rule). 
87. King, 392 U.S. at 325-26 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
88. See id. at 323; see also 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1994) (repealed 1996). 
89. See King, 392 U.S. at 325-26 n.22; see also BELL, supra note 15, at 147. Secretary 
Fleming said of the ruling: 
Effective July 1, 1961, a state plan ... may not impose an eligibility 
condition that would deny assistance with respect to a needy child on 
the basis that the home conditions in which the child lives are un-
suitable, while the child continues to reside in the home. Assistance will 
therefore be continued during the time efforts are being made ei-
ther to improve the home conditions or to make arrangements for 
the child elsewhere. 
It is of great importance that state agencies should be concerned about the ef-
fects on children of the environment in which they are living and that services 
be provided which will be directed toward affording the children maximum 
protection and strengthening family life. Whenever there is a question 
of the suitability of the home for the child's upbringing, steps should 
be taken to correct the situation or, in the alternative, to arrange for 
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analyzed Alabama's demonstrated willingness to deny AFDC assis-
tance in response to an unwed mother's behavior while leaving the 
children in a home situation that had been deemed unsuitable, 
thereby depriving the children of the needed care and assistance of 
AFDC benefits.90 Mter the statutory adoption of the Flemming Rul-
ing, and despite longstanding practice to the contrary,91 the King 
Court held that there remained no permissible grounds for denying 
AFDC benefits to families otherwise qualified, including state efforts 
to control illegitimate childbearing or to discourage sexual promis-
cuity, if the children were to be left in the home after termination 
of benefits.92 
Interestingly, the Cager majority acknowledged that King had 
specifically recognized the states' right to remove children from 
homes found to be neglectful or unsuitable.93 Indeed, concerning il-
legitimacy and the states' right to take measures to discourage ille-
gitimacy, the King Court stated: 
[T] he question of Alabama's general power to deal with 
conduct it regards as immoral and with the problem of ille-
gitimacy [is not involved in this case]. This appeal [only 
raises] the question [ofl whether the State may deal with these 
problems in the manner that it has here-lJy flatly denying AFDC 
assistance to otherwise eligible dependent children. 
Alabama's ... interests in discouraging immorality and illegiti-
macy . . . are not presently legitimate justifications for AFDC 
disqualification.94 
The rationale for the Flemming Ruling and its statutory enact-
ment could not be reasonably construed as an effort to discourage 
or otherwise affect state efforts to control or discourage illegiti-
other appropriate care of the child. It is completely inconsistent, however, 
to declare a home unsuitable for a child to receive assistance and at 
the same time permit him to remain in the same home exposed to 
the same environment. 
BELL, supra note IS, at 147 (emphasis added). 
90. See King, 392 U.S. at 311. 
91. See BELL, supra note 15, at 76-92; see also id. at 93-110. 
92. See King, 342 U.S. at 324. 
93. See In re Cager, 251 Md. 473, 480, 248 A.2d 384, 388-99 (1968). 
94. King, 392 U.S. at 320 (emphasis added); see also Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 
(1970). The Court said of its ruling in King: "King v. Smith held only that a le-
gal obligation to support [children] was a necessary condition for qualifica-
tion as a [non-absent] 'parent' [under AFDC regulations]." Lewis, 397 U.S. at 
559. 
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macy.95 The provision was not intended to address state efforts to 
evaluate the moral stability of home conditions on grounds of serial 
illegitimacy, nor was it intended to otherwise speak to the moral be-
lief that illegitimacy was socially harmful, inherently harmful to chil-
dren personally, or properly within the purview of traditional state 
powers with respect to child welfare.96 
In Gager, the very basis for suit was that Maryland authorities 
had made alternate provisions for the children in question, which 
had not been the case in King.97 Therefore, the King Court's hold-
ing, striking down Alabama's categorical denial of AFDC benefits to 
women and their children as a means of discouraging illegitimacy, 
offered no guidance as to the pivotal issue in Gager. whether a child 
is in a stable moral environment.98 
The Gager court's misplaced reliance on King was also obscured 
by two misleading arguments. First, the Gager court focused on the 
issue of AFDC benefits and their eligibility requirement.99 The court 
declared that "a State may not deny AFDC assistance to dependent 
children 'on the basis of their mother's alleged immorality or to dis-
courage illegitimate births.' "100 Although legally correct, this state-
ment was irrelevant to the facts in Gager. The children in Gager had 
not been denied AFDC assistance in the manner addressed in ei-
ther King or the Flemming ruling. These children were not being 
left in a home which had been disqualified from AFDC eligibility 
on the grounds of poor home conditions. 101 To the contrary, the 
Gager children were placed in foster care,102 and Maryland made 
"provision [s] ... for adequate care and assistance" in compliance 
95. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. 
96. The King decision was followed two years later by Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 
(1970), which went further by invalidating Man Assuming the Role of Spouse 
(MARS) regulations. Under MARS regulations, the income of a man actually 
residing in a home was counted in assessing a household's AFDC eligibility. See 
Lewis, 397 U.S. at 554. MARS regulations were fundamentally different from 
Man in the House rules because the latter made eligibility dependent on a 
mother's conduct. See King, 392 U.S. at 324. On the other hand, MARS regula-
tions were not aimed at behavior modification, but were instead concerned 
solely with household members and their assets. See Lewis, 397 U.S. at 554. 
97. See Gager, 251 Md. at 476-77, 248 A.2d at 386-87. The children were placed in 
foster homes. See id. 
98. See id. at 477-78, 248 A.2d at 387. 
99. See id. at 480, 248 A.2d at 388-89. 
100. Id. at 480, 248 A.2d at 388-89 (quoting King, 392 U.S. at 324). 
101. See supra notes 85-96 and accompanying text. 
102. See Gager, 251 Md. at 477, 248 A.2d at 387. 
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with the AFDC requirements. 103 
Second, the majority imputed to the Prince George's County 
State's Attorney the purportedly evil motive of seeking only to pun-
ish mothers for engaging in behavior of which the State's Attorney 
personally disapproved. I04 The court indicated that the State's ac-
tions and ill motive proceeded outside the proper scope of state au-
thority with regard to AFDC administration and lacked concern for 
the children. lOS The claim that the State's Attorney acted to "use the 
children as pawns in a plan to punish their mothers for their past 
promiscuity and to discourage them and other females of like weak-
nesses and inclinations from future [childbearing],"106 however, is 
answered by the preceding discussion of the grounds for the King 
decision. I07 Maryland authorities had not acted in ways that King or 
statutory law had deemed impermissible. Rather, Maryland had pro-
vided for adequate care and assistance outside the context of 
AFDC.I08 Thus, if there had been a crusade against illegitimate 
childbearing, as the Cager majority characterized the State's Attor-
ney's actions, it was a crusade mounted not by the State's Attorney, 
but by the legislature, acting within the constraints of legitimate au-
thority.l09 If there was a crusade by the legislature, it could not be 
justifiably characterized as either impermissible or unwarranted. 
The majority also found critical fault in the State's Attorney's 
use of confidential information from the plaintiffs' AFDC applica-
tions. llo The mothers' applications revealed to county authorities 
that the names of the fathers and their respective children did not 
match, which provided the State's Attorney with statutory grounds 
to initiate investigations. I I I 
The court found that federal guidelines l12 and accompanying 
103. 42 U.S.C. § 604(b) (1994); see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 48A (1995). 
104. See Cager at 481, 248 A.2d at 389. 
105. See id. at 480, 248 A.2d at 388-89. 
106. Id. at 480, 248 A.2d at 389. 
107. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. 
108. See infra notes 120-37 and accompanying text. 
109. See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text. 
110. See Cager, 251 Md. at 481-82, 248 A.2d at 389. 
111. See id. at 482, 248 A.2d at 389. 
112. See id. The court simply refers to "[a] regulation of the United States Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare," without further explanation. Id. at 
482, 248 A.2d at 390. The court was apparently referring to a statute which 
provided, "[A state plan must] provide safeguards which restrict the use or 
disclosure of information concerning applicants or recipients." 
42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (9) (1994) (repealed 1996). 
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state regulationsl13 forbade using information gathered for program 
administration in ways tending to subject applicants to "exploitation 
and embarrassment," or that would constitute use of information 
for a purpose other than that for which it was provided. 114 The 
court stated that such information must "be used only by persons 
with appropriate authority, and only for purposes directly connected 
with the administration of welfare programs." 115 
Again, the court's conclusion merits close examination. The 
statutory requirement of confidentiality regarding records of AFDC 
participants expressly permits the use of such information in fur-
therance of an investigation or civil proceeding that concerns plan 
participants. 116 The statute also provides that investigating and inter-
ceding in instances of suspected or actual neglect is not only per-
mitted, but required of state plans. ll7 
Other fundamental objections can be made about the Gager 
majority's assertions concerning proper administrative purposes 
within the context of an approved state AFDC plan and the scope 
113. See Gager, 251 Md. at 482, 248 A.2d at 390. (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 5 
(1995), and The State Department of Public Welfare Rule 1000, Confidential 
Nature of Records). 
114. [d. at 482, 248 A.2d at 390. 
115. [d. This language echoed the pertinent statutory provision, found in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 602 (a) (9) (1994) (repealed 1996), which mandated that a state plan: 
Provide safeguards which restrict the use or disclosure of information 
concerning applicants or recipients for purposes directly connected 
with (A) the administration of the plan of the State ... (B) any in-
vestigation, prosecution, or . . . civil proceeding, conducted in con-
nection with the administration of any such plan or program ... (D) 
any audit or similar activity conducted ... by any governmental en-
tity which is authorized by law to conduct such audit or activity, and 
(E) reporting and providing information ... with respect to known 
or suspected child abuse or neglect. 
42 U.S.C. § 602 (1994) (repealed 1996). Furthermore, the prior § 602 
(a) (16)(A) mandated that the state agency charged with administering AFDC 
"[r]eport to an appropriate agency or official, known or suspected instances 
of . . . negligent treatment or maltreatment of a child receiving aid . . . 
under circumstances which indicate that the child's health or welfare is 
threatened." [d. 
116. See supra note 115. 
117. See 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a)(9) (B) (1994) (repealed 1996). Specifically, the statute 
authorized that civil proceedings be undertaken within the context of ad-
ministering the plan, but monitoring and responding to neglect was an au-
thorized administrative objective under § 602(a)(16)(A). See supra note 115 
for text of both § 602 (a)(9) (B) and § 602(a) (16)(A). 
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of state law enforcement authority within the context of AFDC ad-
ministration. These objections, grounded in the origin and design 
of the AFDC program, are best addressed in the larger context of 
Judge Barnes's dissent. lIs In the course of his dissent, Judge Barnes 
persuasively rebutted the majority's reading of Section 52(f) and 
demonstrated that the majority's understanding of the statute was 
not only unreasonable, but would strip the statute of all meaning 
and effect. 1I9 
The dissent focused on the origin of Section 52 (f) which was 
derived from recommendations of the Commission. 120 A review of 
the Commission's working assumptions, and the legislature's subse-
quent adoption of measures pursuant to the Commission's findings 
and recommendations, including the statutory provisions challenged 
in Cager, will provide the complete backdrop against which the ma-
jority decision can be fully appreciated. 
III. JUDGE BARNES'S DISSENT AND THE COMMISSION TO 
STUDY PROBLEMS OF ILLEGITIMACY 
In his dissent in Cager, Judge Barnes staunchly defended the 
State's Attorney's use of information acquired from welfare applica-
tions to initiate the child neglect investigations. 121 He argued that 
the State's Attorney's actions were proper and well within the scope 
of state and federal regulations,122 whereas the majority found that 
the State's Attorney had abused his authority.123 Judge Barnes also 
argued that the State's Attorney's actions in his capacity as an ad-
ministrative agent, effectuating the intent of the statute which re-
quired his actions, were not only consistent with the goals of the 
AFDC program, but were essential to its proper fulfillment. l24 
Judge Barnes noted that state statutes and regulations gov-
erning the administration of AFDCI25 require that neglect proceed-
118. See infra notes 118-63 and accompanying text. 
119. See infra notes 144-59 and accompanying text. 
120. See infra notes 147-60 and accompanying text. 
121. See In re Cager, 251 Md. 473, 501-D2, 248 A.2d. 384, 40O-D1 (1968) (Barnes, J. 
dissenting) . 
122. See id. (Barnes, J., dissenting). 
123. See id. at 483, 248 A.2d at 390. 
124. See id. at 502, 248 A.2d at 401 (Barnes, J. dissenting). See infra notes 121-34 
and accompanying text for a discussion of the purposes and guidelines gov-
erning administration of AFDC by the states and the breadth of administrative 
discretion the states were originally intended to exert over AFDC programs 
with respect to child welfare. 
125. Each state plan must be submitted to the United States Secretary of Health 
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ings be instituted "when information obtained by the Welfare De-
partment indicates that a child is neglected." 126 This regulation 
merely implements the federal requirement that state plans provide 
a means to ascertain and act upon apparent instances of neglect. 127 
Moreover, although federal law specifies that detecting and prevent-
ing neglect is a proper administrative aim of state plans, it imposes 
no preemptive definition 'of neglect. 128 As Judge Barnes declared: 
"The information on Form 218 may be used in the investigation of 
cases of apparent neglect as such an investigation is directly con-
nected with the welfare program. "129 The State's Attorney is unques-
tionably "an appropriate authority" to whom neglect should be re-
ported, and investigating instances of alleged neglect for the 
purpose of possibly removing a child from a home is a "criminal or 
civil proceeding, conducted in connection with the administration 
of [a] plan."130 Indeed, it is difficult to ascertain who, other than a 
prosecutor, could possibly be expected to conduct such an inquiry. 
Therefore, Judge Barnes observed, when acting on information con-
cerning neglect, information provided in compliance with Section 
48A of the Maryland Code, the State's Attorney "[is] merely an ad-
ministrative agent for the Welfare Department .... "131 Thus, "it [is] 
the duty of the State's Attorney to file an appropriate petition to as-
certain whether or not the child was a neglected child as defined by 
the statute. "132 
It is instructive to consider Judge Barnes's statements concern-
ing the fundamental purpose of AFDC in the context of the state 
actions challenged in eager. Because the very purpose of the pro-
gram is to advance the well-being of qualified children,133 Judge 
and Human Services (then Health, Education, and Welfare) for approval 
before a state may receive AFDC federal matching funds. See 42 U.S.C. § 601 
(1994) (repealed 1996). 
126. Cager, 251 Md. at 501, 248 A.2d at 400 (Barnes, J., dissenting) (citing MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 88A, § 48A (1996 Supp.». 
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(16)(A) (1996 Supp.). Section 602 (16)(A) requires that 
state agencies "report to an appropriate agency or official, known or sus-
pected instances of ... negligent treatment or maltreatment of a child receiv-
ing aid [from the state's public assistance program]." [d. 
128. See supra note 115. 
129. Cager, 251 Md. at 501, 248 A.2d at 400. 
130. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (9) (1994) (repealed 1996). 
131. Cager, 251 Md. at 502, 248 A.2d at 401. 
132. [d. 
133. See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1994) (repealed 1996) ("[e]ncouraging the care of de-
pendent children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives ... and 
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Barnes observed that" [i] t can hardly be contended that it is a pur-
pose of the AFDC program to subsidize those who neglect their 
children or to provide for the continuance of the neglect of a 
child!"134 To the contrary, establishing means of shielding children 
from neglect is more than an administrative aim "directly con-
nected with the administration of [AFDC]."135 It is an indispensable 
component of any program with aims such as those envisioned by 
AFDC: "The removal of neglected children from that assistance, the 
placing of them in proper foster homes or providing for other 
proper methods for eliminating the neglect must, of necessity, be 
directly connected with the administration of the welfare 
program." 136 
Regarding Judge Barnes's remarks on the overreaching purpose 
of the 'AFDC program, it is also instructive to consider the policy 
goals behind the creation of AFDC. AFDC was originally intended 
as a program for orphans and widows,137 for children and a parent 
or guardian who had been abandoned by a breadwinner or had 
been "deprived of support" due to the illness, death, or sudden in-
capacity of a breadwinner, or for minor children where other cir-
cumstances had left a mother, or other named relative or legal 
guardian,138 incapable of supporting the children under his or her 
care. The program was not intended to redefine the family, to fore-
close or preempt family formation, or to undermine the institution 
of fatherhood and the paternal ordering of American society.139 
[to] strengthen family life and to help such parents or relatives to attain or re-
tain capability for the maximum self-support and personal independence consistent with 
the maintenance of parental care and protection" (emphasis added». 
134. Cager, 251 Md. at 502, 248 A.2d at 401 (Barnes, j., dissenting). Furthermore, 
because the case was before the court on stipulated facts conceding the illegit-
imacy of the children in question, and determining such was the only purpose 
for which Form 218 was employed by the State, the issue of whether the use 
of Form 218 was appropriate was foreclosed from review by the court. See id. 
(Barnes, j., dissenting). 
135. [d. (Barnes, j., dissenting). 
136. [d. (Barnes, j., dissenting). Furthermore, although 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (15) (A) 
provides that a state develop programs for family planning and contraception, 
it must be noted that this provision did not preclude other approaches to ad-
dress out-of-wedlock childbearing. See 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(15)(A) (1994) (re-
pealed 1996). 
137. See Gwendolyn Mink, Welfare Reform in Historical Perspective, 26 CONN. L. REv. 
879,880 (1994); see also BELL, supra note 15, at 3-19. 
138. See Irene Lurie, Major Changes in the Structure of AFDC Program Since 1935, 59 
CORNELL L. REv. 825, 826 (1974) (discussing the origin of AFDC). 
139. See generally STEVEN GoLDBERG, WHY MEN RULE: A THEORY OF MALE DOMINANCE 
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Family circumstances targeted by AFDC policy objectives are 
clearly distinguishable from those present in Gager,140 as well as 
those to which Section 52 (f) (6) could have applied. Because illegiti-
macy often involves men who have never acted as providers to their 
children, and who have never been present a~ a parent in the 
home, it is reasonable to doubt whether a child under such circum-
stances has been deprived of the support of a now-absent parent in 
the specific manner contemplated by the framers of AFDC. It is also 
reasonable to contemplate that children in multiple illegitimate sib-
ling, single mother families, the situation to which Section 52(f) ap-
plies,· are less deprived than neglected. 141 
The high ratio of women who were never married, particularly 
younger women on the AFDC roster, is a relatively recent develop-
ment. 142 From 1942 to 1967, the percentage of women heads of 
households eligible for AFDC whose reason for eligibility was de-
fined as the "single motherhood of a woman who had never been 
married" increased from ten percent to approximately twenty-eight 
percent. 143 While widowhood or physical disability combined to ac-
count for some fifty-nine percent of AFDC eligibility in 1942, those 
combined categories accounted for less than twenty percent of the 
basis for AFDC eligibility in 1967 and less than seven percent of the 
basis for AFDC eligibility as of 1992,144 Moreover, because AFDC was 
instituted to "help maintain and strengthen family life"145 and to 
"help . . . parents or relatives to attain or retain capability for . . . 
maximum self-support and personal independence,"I46 it is indispu-
table that serial illegitimacy, without means of support other than 
(1993) (discussing the anthropological and sociological aspects of the writer's 
view of a paternalistic society). 
140. See Gager, 251 Md. at 478 n.2, 248 A.2d at 387 n.2. In addition to being unwed, 
two of the mothers were teenagers. See id. 
141. See supra note 21 for a discussion of § 52(f). 
142. See infra note 143 and accompanying text. 
143. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REpORT TO CONGRESS ON 
OUT-QF-WEDLOCK CHILDBEARING, DHH PUB.No. (PHS) 95-1257, 63 (1995). 
[hereinafter REpORT TO CONGRESS]. The figure as of 1992 was fIfty-eight per-
cent. See id. 
144. See id. However, the percentage of AFDC-eligible mothers for whom grounds 
for eligibility is separation or divorce from a husband has remained compara-
tively constant, increasing from approximately 25% in 1942 to approximately 
35% in 1992. See id. The figure for 1992 actually represented a significant de-
cline for this category of eligibility from a peak of nearly 45% in 1967. See id. 
145. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1994) (repealed 1996) (emphasis added). 
146. [d. 
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public assistance, is profoundly contrary to the foundational objec-
tives of the program. 
The facts in Cager were typical of the rapidly changing structure 
of AFDC households at that time, and the increasing tendency of 
such households to be formed in a manner quite different from the 
average AFDC-eligible household when the program was first 
adopted. 147 Judge Barnes's assertions concerning the rationale un-
derlying AFDC and the proper scope of state administrative discre-
tion in light of AFDC's original aims were therefore entirely correct. 
It is a matter of speculation, of course, whether present circum-
stances, had they prevailed in 1935, would have altered or even pre-
vented adoption of the AFDC program, or whether AFDC would be 
adopted today in the same form in response to present 
circumstances. 148 
Judge Barnes assailed the majority's reading of both the statute 
. itself and the necessary interrelation of the provisions of Section 
52(f) .149 In particular, he found indefensible the majority's conclu-
sion that the legislature had not intended for serial illegitimacy to 
be sufficient grounds to constitute neglect. 150 Judge Barnes began by 
noting that the six primary criteria enumerated in Section 52 (f) are 
separated by semicolons with the final criterion preceded by the dis-
junctive connector "or," indicating that the criteria are alternative 
rather than cumulative. 151 He also pointed out that the statute could 
not possibly have been meant to require a showing of all six criteria 
as a precondition to enforceability.152 For example, Judge Barnes 
questioned how the fourth criterion, referring to a child whose 
guardian or parent fails to provide necessary medical, surgical, insti-
tutional or hospital care, could not be sufficient in itself to amount 
to neglect. 153 He also questioned how the legislature could have 
147. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text. 
148. The 105th Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which ended AFDC as a federal entitlement. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1994). PRWORA turned AFDC into a program of block 
grants given to the states. See id. The states have expanded discretion to inde-
pendently administer all aspects of the program. See id. Also, for the first time, 
PROWRA mandates work requirements for specified adult beneficiaries. See 42 
U.S.C. § 607 (b) (2) (a) (1994). 
149. See In re Cager, 251 Md. 473, 486-501, 248 A.2d 384, 392400 (1968) (Barnes, J., 
dissenting). 
150. See id. 
151. See id. at 486, 248 A.2d at 392; see also supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
152. See Cager, 251 Md. at 487-88, 248 A.2d at 393. 
153. See id. at 487, 248 A.2d at 393. 
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meant for such neglect to be ignored by state officials unless an-
other listed criterion of neglect were found to also be present. He 
reasoned that if the six primary criteria of neglect were not alterna-
tive, but could only be proven if concurrently present with at least 
one other criteria, it would be practically impossible for a child to 
ever be deemed neglected under the statute. 154 Criterion six and its 
five su1:rcriteria, Judge Barnes concluded, must be a self contained 
set of considerations, sufficient in themselves to establish whether 
an environment is morally stable.155 
To further demonstrate that the majority's interpretation was 
untenable, Judge Barnes discussed the court of appeals's statutory 
construction in In re Cromwell 156 Cromwell involved a determination 
of juvenile delinquency under Article 26, Section 52 (e), which iden-
tically paralleled Section 52 (f) in structure. 157 In Cromwell, the court 
found "delinquency" to be proven on the basis of a single crite-
rion,158 without any suggestion that a concurrence of multiple crite-
ria was necessary. Judge Barnes applied this same reasoning in his 
dissent in Cager, observing that the six criteria of Section 52(f) must 
each be independently sufficient to establish neglect. 159 Further, 
Judge Barnes noted that the five su1:rcriteria for ascertaining a "sta-
ble moral environment" are set out in a format identical to that em-
154. See id. at 487-88, 248 A.2d at 393. 
155. See id. 
156. 232 Md. 409, 194 A.2d 88 (1963). 
157. Cromwell quoted the pertinent section of the statute at issue, MD. ANN. CODE 
OF 1957 art. 26, § 52(e), as follows: 
(e) "Delinquent child" means a child 
(1) who violates any law or ordinance, or who commits any act 
which, if committed by an adult, would be a crime not punish-
able by death or life imprisonment; 
(2) who is incorrigible or ungovernable or habitually disobedi-
ent or who is beyond the control of his parents, guardian, cus-
todian or other lawful authority; 
(3) who is habitually a truant; 
(4) who without just cause and without the consent of his par-
ents, guardian, or other custodian, repeatedly deserts his home 
or place of abode; 
(5) who is engaged in any occupation which is in violation of 
law, or who associates with immoral or vicious persons; or 
(6) who so deports himself as to injure or endanger the morals 
of himself or others. 
Cromwell, 232 Md. at 412, 194 A.2d at 89. 
158. See id. at 414, 194 A.2d at 90. 
159. See Cager, 251 Md. at 486, 248 A.2d at 392. 
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ployed in Cromwell for ascertaining delinquency160 and, therefore, 
must also be both alternative and individually sufficient. 161 Indeed, 
as with the six primary criteria, a requirement that the five sub-
criteria be understood as concurrent rather than alternative deter-
minants of neglect would certainly doom the statute to 
unenforceability.162 
To illustrate, a mother would need to have given birth to an il-
legitimate child in the twelve months prior to the filing of a neglect 
petition (sub-criterion five), and be currently pregnant with another 
illegitimate child at the time a petition is filed (sub-criterion six), 
before criterion six would be enforceable, a result Judge Barnes de-
scribed as "absurd and unjust."163 Therefore, Judge Barnes main-
tained that the statutory requirement that courts consider the five 
listed sub-criteria "among other things" should be understood to 
mean only that the court may look to other considerations beyond 
those listed in determining whether a home environment is morally 
unstable; however, establishing anyone of the listed sub-criteria 
necessarily constitutes sufficient proof. l64 
Judge Barnes argued that even if some degree of ambiguity 
were conceded, a process of basic statutory construction would still 
lead to the conclusion that the legislature meant for serial illegiti-
macy to be sufficient grounds for finding neglect under Section 
52(f)}65 He observed that the duty of the court when considering a 
statute is to carry out the clear legislative intent}66 If a statute is 
"ambiguous, the courts should consider the evils or mischief which 
the Legislature sought to remedy and should construe the language 
so as to effectuate the general purposes and policies of the legisla-
tion."167 Judge Barnes noted that there was no difficulty determin-
ing what the legislature wished to do when it adopted Section 
160. See id. at 488, 248 A.2d at 396. 
161. See id. 
162. See generally id. at 488-91, 248 A.2d at 393-95 (discussing statutory ambiguity 
and legislative intent). 
163. Id. at 489, 248 A.2d at 393. 
164. See id. at 489, 248 A.2d at 393-94. 
165. See id. at 490, 248 A.2d at 394. 
166. See id. at 489, 248 A.2d at 394 (quoting Maryland Med. Serv., Inc. v. Carver, 
238 Md. 466, 477-78, 209 A.2d 582, 588 (1965) ("The cardinal rule of construc-
tion of a statute is to discover and to carry out the real legislative inten-
tion.") ). 
167. Id. at 490, 248 A.2d at 394 (citing Cooley v. White Cross Health and Beauty 
Aid Discount Ctrs., Inc., 229 Md. 343, 350, 183 A.2d 381, 385-86 (1962». 
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52(f) (6) 168 because the statute was an outgrowth of the work done 
by the "excellent Commission to Study Problems of Illegitimacy. "169 
The following consideration of the Commission's work, and its rec-
ommendations which provided the basis for Article 26, Section 
52(f), demonstrates with even greater certainty that the purpose of 
Section 52(f) was, without any ambiguity whatsoever, to perform the 
function that was essentially denied by the Cager majority. 
IV. THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY 
PROBLEMS OF ILLEGITIMACY 
The Commission cited in its final Report (the Report) two pro-
positions as the foundation of its inquiry: "1. That illegitimacy is, in 
itself, a social problem for the entire community; and 2. That illegit-
imacy among recipients of Aid to Dependent Children creates spe-
cial problems of grave concern." 170 The Report further declared 
that 
Illegitimacy now presents a growing ... problem to the 
community[,] ... the 'home without a family.' Such homes 
have no fathers in the social sense, the illegitimate children 
residing with their mothers. This creates a form of 'family 
life' which is in conflict with all accepted standards of child 
welfare. These female centered families may consist of 
mother, daughters, other female relatives-all with illegiti-
mate children, fathered by a series of non-resident males. l7l 
The Commission opined that "American Society is based on the 
family as the basic unit of the social order through which husband 
and wife by their coordinated industry and self-sacrifice, provide for 
the religious, moral, social, emotional and economic needs of their 
growing children." 172 
There is a strong resemblance between the Commission's com-
ments and observations concerning welfare and illegitimacy as it was 
waged twenty-five years ago and today's debate. For example, the 
Commission noted that "[r] eported increases in the extent to which 
illegitimacy appears in the Aid to Dependent Children program, 
168. See id. at 489, 248 A.2d at 393-94. 
169. [d. at 490, 248 A.2d at 394. 
170. COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 9, at 12. 
171. [d. at 13. 
172. [d. (quoting GoVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON PROBLEMS OF ILLEGITIMACY, INTERIM 
REpORT 17 (1960). 
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have caused an aroused public to demand ... action,"173 and that 
"[i] t is strongly suspected by many that ... Aid to Dependent Chil-
dren ... actually encourages illegitimacy .... "174 
The Commission further observed that" [c]ritics of the [AFDC] 
program, pointing to the original objective of 'strengthening family 
life,' cite the reported increase in the number of second and third 
generation families with illegitimate children that have been receiv-
ing assistance over the past twenty-five years as indicative of the pro-
gram's failure."175 Furthermore, the Commission noted that these 
critics are increasingly of the opinion that "[AFDC] is merely a dole 
which continues undesirable conditions."176 The Report suggested 
that "[ t] he community's failure to . . . have confidence in the 
[AFDC] program is evidenced by its increasing unwillingness to sup-
port it without assurance of efforts to correct the problem."177 
The core of the Commission's Report consisted of nineteen 
recommendations set out in chapter 3,178 each accompanied by a 
173. Id. at 14. 
174. Id. at 14-15. 
175. Id. at 15. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. The Commission also noted widespread doubts concerning both the com-
petence and intentions of those administering the program: "The question is 
often raised as to whether [those] in executive positions possess sufficient 
background in management and personnel administration to handle such 
enormous amounts of money, and whether a majority of case workers are 
knowledgeable enough to control the distribution of money in the public's 
best interest." Id. 
178. See id. at 22-38. Recommendation One proposed new procedures for establish-
ing paternity and determining custody and guardianship, recommended that 
the bastardy law be repealed, and that § 38 of Article III of the Maryland Con-
stitution be amended to allow delinquencies in child support payments of 
both legitimate and illegitimate children as exceptions from the prohibition 
against imprisonment for debt; Recommendation Two proposed what would 
become the five sulxriteria to MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 52(f) (6) (1966) (re-
pealed 1969), concerning the determination of an unstable moral environ-
ment; Recommendation Three advised against passing legislation that would 
either recognize common law marriage or punish "illicit cohabitation"; Rec-
ommendation Four advised against legalizing abortion or sterilization as meth-
ods of addressing illegitimacy; Recommendation Five suggested that Congress 
be asked to consider whether children should be permitted to receive AFDC 
benefits through a man who has either acknowledged paternity or who has 
been declared a needy child's natural father in a court proceeding; Recom-
mendation Six recommended that the Legislative Council investigate the de-
sirability of permitting marriage by civil ceremony in Maryland; Recommenda-
tion Seven proposed that Maryland's legislation implementing the state AFDC 
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discussion of the Committee's underlying rationale and expecta-
tions. Recommendations Two and Seven are of particular signifi-
cance to the holding in Gager and the dissent, because they were 
the source of the substance of Section 52(£).179 
Recommendation Two proposed that the definition of a "ne-
glected child" be revised and "broadened to provide that a child 
whether legitimate or illegitimate is neglected if living in a home 
which fails to provide a stable moral environment; and to further 
provide that the absence of such stable moral environment is prima 
facie established" if any of the five criteria are met. lso The list of cri-
teria suggested by the Commission to establish such prima facie evi-
dence consisted almost verbatim of the sub-criteria that were codi-
fied as Section 52(£) (6) (i)_(V).ISI 
program be revised to state that the overreaching goal of the program is to 
"strengthen family life" (this language is identical to that used in the AFDC 
statute, see supra note 133), and that suitable home and neglect standards be 
revised in a manner that was soon realized as MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 52(f) 
(1966) (repealed 1969); Recommendation Eight proposed creation of a state-
wide coordinated network of social work services for illegitimately pregnant 
women; Recommendation Nine proposed creation of a Division of Child Wel-
fare and several related recommendations; Recommendation Ten suggested 
measures to facilitate a continuing state responsibility for the prevention and 
control of illegitimacy; Recommendation Eleven suggested implementation of 
a permanent illegitimacy reporting capacity; Recommendation Twelve sug-
gested the appointment of a committee to inquire into personnel administra-
tion policies of the Department of Public Welfare; Recommendation Thirteen 
proposed that the Governor appoint a committee to study the matter of relig-
ious and moral education in the public schools of Maryland; Recommenda-
tion Fourteen recommended authorization for state entities to refer clients or 
patients for family planning services and counseling; Recommendation Fifteen 
recommended that the procedures and requirements relating to the issuance 
of birth certificates be revised in various ways to assist establishing a means for 
tracking paternity or illegitimacy; Recommendations Sixteen through 
Nineteen concerned various proposals for the gathering and sharing of infor-
mation and related coordination among different state agencies with regard 
to illegitimacy and implementation of a continuous administrative capacity to 
monitor and control it. See COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 9, at 22-38. 
179. See generally COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 9, at 24-25, 27-28. 
180. Id. at 24. 
181. See id. The full text of Recommendation Two provides: 
[T]he absence of [a] stable moral environment is prima facie estalr 
lished if the parent, guardian or person with whom the child lives: 
(1) Is unable to provide such environment by reasons of imma-
turity, emotional, mental or physical disability, 
(2) Is engaging in promiscuous conduct inside or outside the 
home, 
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In Recommendation Seven, the Commission suggested that Ma-
ryland's Aid to Dependent Children Lawl82 be subject to three 
amendments. 183 First, the Commission recommended that a state-
ment of policy be incorporated into the law declaring that the pro-
gram's primary purpose is to strengthen family life and to assist 
qualified families toward maximum independence within a certain 
time frame and in homes suitable for children. l84 Second, the Com-
mission recommended that the suitable home clause of the state's 
ADC law be amended to provide that assistance will not be given if 
there is reasonable cause to believe that a child in the home is ne-
glected, with exceptions to allow for remedial actions. 18S Third, the 
(3) Is co-habiting with a person to whom he or she is not 
married, 
(4) Is pregnant with an illegitimate child, or 
(5) Has, within a period of twelve months preceding the filing 
of the petition alleging neglect, either been pregnant with or 
given birth to an illegitimate child in addition to the child 
whose neglect is complained of. 
Id.; cf. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 52(f) (6) (i)-(v) (1966) (repealed 1969). See gen-
eraUy supra note 21 (providing full text of § 52(f). 
182. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 48A (1966). 
183. See COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 9, at 27-28. 
184. See ill. at 27. 
185. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 48A (1966). The provision then in force read as 
follows: 
Id. 
[A]ssistance shall be given to any dependent child who: 
(a) Has resided in this State for one year immediately preced-
ing the application for such assistance; or who was born within 
one year immediately preceding the application, if the parent 
or relative with whom the child is living has resided in this 
State for one year immediately preceding the date of applica-
tion; or whose parent has resided in this State for one year im-
mediately preceding the date of application; provided, how-
ever, that the State Department is authorized and empowered 
to make reciprocal arrangements with other states to waive resi-
dence requirements when, in their judgement, the same are 
deemed necessary, so long as the waiver does not invalidate 
federal matching, the foregoing State residence requirement 
shall be considered abrogated and rendered null and void si-
multaneously with the effective date of such federal enactment. 
(b) Is living in a family home meeting the standards of care 
and health, fixed by the laws of this State and any rules and 
regulations adopted pursuant thereto, and in which home the 
child's particular religious faith should· be fostered and pro-
tected, if possible. 
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Commission recommended that the welfare department of each po-
litical subdivision in Maryland be charged with alerting those on as-
sistance of reasons why assistance may be suspended, to impose a 
thirty-day time limit for corrective action, and to file a petition al-
leging neglect and seeking action on the child's behalf when cir-
cumstances· require. 186 
The comment accompanying Recommendation Seven is partic-
ularly enlightening. It stated that the neglect to which Recommen-
dation Seven refers would include the type of neglect described in 
Recommendation Two-"failure to provide a child with a stable 
moral environment."187 The Commission further stated: 
[T] he recommended legislation would not deprive any 
needy child of support because of the unacceptable con-
duct of the mother or other person having its care. It 
would provide the welfare departments with an opportunity 
to help the person through aggressive casework to either 
correct the undesirable conditions in the home or place the 
child in an acceptable [home]. ... The Commission believes 
that laws relating to [AFDC] should provide for the child's 
moral environment as well as ... physical needs, and that 
neglect not corrected within a thirty-day period should be 
referred to the court and changes effected under its direc-
tion. Under the recommended legislation the child is assured 
of continued SUpport. 188 
On the question of statutory construction, Judge Barnes noted that 
the original draft of the bill, which became Article 26, Section 
52 (f) ,189 provided the phrase "the absence of such stable moral envi-
ronment is prima facie established if"190 followed by the language at 
Section 52(f) (6) (i)-(v).191 By amendment, these words were later re-
placed with the phrase" [i]n determining whether such stable moral 
environment exists, the court shall consider, among other things 
.... "192 Judge Barnes observed this change indicated that the leg-
islature, while intending mandatory consideration of the listed crite-
186. See COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 9, at 27-28. 
187. Id. at 28. 
188. Id. (emphasis added). 
189. See In re Cager, 251 Md. 473,494,248 A.2d 384, 397 (1968) (Barnes,]., dissent-
ing). 
190. COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 9, at 24 (Recommendation Two). 
191. See supra note 21 (providing full text of § 52(f). 
192. eager, 251 Md. at 495, 248 A.2d at 397 (Barnes,]., dissenting). 
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ria, wished to specify that they need not be exclusive considera-
tions. 193 The legislature intended to broaden the court's discretion 
in assessing whether an environment is neglectful, not to erect ob-
stacles to the court's ability to make such a determination. 194 Gener-
ally, Judge Barnes observed that bearing multiple illegitimate chil-
dren while on public assistance has been deemed to be inherently 
neglectful, and removing children from such an environment was in 
keeping with other court decisions and child welfare statutes at that 
time. 195 Finally, the dissent observed that there was no attempt by 
the plaintiffs to present any actual evidence that the children were 
not living in neglectful circumstances. 196 "The failure to produce 
any such evidence," Judge Barnes stated, "indicates strongly to me 
that no such evidence was available. "197 
v. THE CONTEXT OF IN RE GAGER 
The actions by Prince George's County authorities in Cager did 
not deprive the children of care and support, even as defined 
under King. The work of the Commission and the legislative history 
of Article 26, Section 52(f), combined with the history and statutory 
language of AFDC, amply demonstrate that the State's actions were 
not only justifiable administrative undertakings within the context 
of AFDC, but were essential to Maryland's ability to fulfill its obliga-
tions under the program. 
The court's construction of the neglected child statute was not 
only contrary to the statute's plain meaning and legislative history, 
but also boldly illogical. However, the Cager court seems to have 
been more concerned with the matters of the AFDC supported chil-
dren than with the children themselves. It was the mothers' predica-
ment, not the children's, that seems to have been the true object of 
the court's solicitousness. Because AFDC is specifically for children, 
however, supporting adults only to the extent that doing so is 
deemed in the interests of children,198 the court was forced to fash-
193. See id. 
194. See id. 
195. See id. at 500.01, 248 A.2d at 399-400 (citing In re Dake, 180 N.E.2d 646, 648 
(Ohio Misc. 1961) (" [I]s a woman who is incapable of ordering her own life 
in accordance with the prevailing legal and moral codes, incapable of raising 
children without a father?"»; see also id. at 501, 248 A.2d at 400 (citing In re 
Turner, 231 N.E.2d 502 (Ohio Misc. 1967». 
196. See id. at 499, 248 A.2d at 399. 
197. Id. 
198. See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1994) ("For the purpose of encouraging ... each State to 
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ion a decoy of reasoning focused' on the children III order to de-
fend the mothers. 
Assuming this inference is correct, the picture changes dramati-
cally. If protecting a mother's status under the program, and shield-
ing her from the moral censure inherent in Section 52(f) is under-
stood to have been the court's true objective, the opinion 
undergoes a metamorphosis: a dense and poorly reasoned opinion, 
utterly blind to obvious and essential distinctions and entirely incon-
sistent with logic, precedent, and legislative history, becomes a sub-
tle maneuver by the court to impose a preferred policy result. Of 
course, such a motive is unprovable in the strict sense. Nonetheless, 
the prevailing jurisprudence and academic thinking at the time of 
Gager underscores the court's true motive. 
In its early years, the AFDC program was tightly budgeted and 
highly moralistic. l99 The administrative policy was deeply concerned 
with individualized management and was characterized by a distinct 
emphasis on personal character, including sexual morality and the 
general conviction that failure in that regard was a primary factor in 
the onset and perpetuation of dependency.200 Moreover, state ad-
ministration of AFDC programs was often racially biased. 201 The 
Flemming Ruling, on the other hand,202 was symptomatic of an 
emerging perspective toward welfare recipients and the proper ad-
ministration of welfare programs that was far less inclined to attri-
bute reliance on transfer payments as evidence of either poor char-
acter or even personal misfortune.203 Instead, this new perspective 
viewed poverty as a symptom of larger structural inequalities inher-
ent in the social framework and inextricable from larger economic 
and racial inequity.204 Poverty bore only a secondary relation to the 
specific character and conduct of individuals receiving public 
assistance.205 
Several United States Supreme Court decisions, and administra-
tive rule changes have reinforced this new way of thinking. For ex-
ample, between 1961 and 1974 AFDC rule changes decreased eligi-
furnish financial assistance ... to needy dependent children and the parents 
or relatives with whom they are living."). 
199. See BELL, supra note 15, at 111-23; see also Lurie, supra note 138, at 838. 
200. See BELL, supra note 15, at 111-23. 
201. See id. at 175, 181-86. 
202. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text. 
203. See generaUy MURRAY, supra note 18, at 2440. 
204. See generaUy id. 
205. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 14. 
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bility requirements,206 imposed mandatory annual increases in 
benefit levels,207 and increased benefit levels in absolute terms.20S A 
breadwinner's unemployment became sufficient grounds for AFDC 
eligibility; this is a fundamental break from past rationale that the 
program was exclusively for those actually incapable of self-
support.209 Administrative changes in allowable levels of income also 
greatly increased the number of persons eligible to receive AFDC.210 
During the same time AFDC eligibility requirements were liber-
alized, state authorities were given only limited discretion to moni-
tor home conditions or to count the assets of unmarried adult 
males residing in the home toward figuring eligibility and benefit 
levels.211 The Supreme Court even discerned a constitutional right 
to travel from state to state without experiencing disturbance to 
one's eligibility on account of varying state eligibility rules.212 Over-
all, there was a rush to extirpate from public policy in general, and 
the administration of AFDC by the states in particular, what had 
from the inception been the standard approach of moral censure 
and suspicion concerning conduct and character among AFDC 
recipients.213 
VI. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE IN RE GAGER AND THE COMMIS-
SION ON ILLEGITIMACY 
Whatever the actual causal relationship is between welfare pro-
grams and the growth in the illegitimacy rate, an examination of 
trends between out-of-wedlock childbearing and divorce strongly 
suggests that the phenomenal growth in illegitimacy among some 
sectors of the population since the mid-1960s is the result of larger 
social trends during that same time period and not unique to those 
receiving public assistance. For instance, between 1960 and 1993 the 
proportion of illegitimate births increased dramatically across the 
206. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1970) (requiring that the first $30.00 plus one-
third of income be disregarded toward determining AFDC eligibility). 
207. See Engelman v. Amos, 404 U.S. 23, 24 (1971) (per curiam) (requiring that the 
$30.00 and one-third disregard be applied to any exclusions in state ceilings 
on gross income for AFDC eligibility). 
208. See id. 
209. See id. 
210. See, e.g., Lurie, supra note 138, at 836-37. 
211. See Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970) (invalidating MARS regulations). 
212. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Specifically, the court held that 
residency requirements for AFDC eligibility violated the constitutional right to 
travel because the restraint fell exclusively on the poor. See id. at 630. 
213. See supra notes 192-94. 
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entire population from approximately six percent of all births in 
1960 to more than thirty percent in 1993.214 Although this trend be-
gan prior to the 1960s, the increase in the number of illegitimate 
births between 1960 and 1980, as opposed to 1940 to 1960, was dra-
matic.2lS The growth in the number of illegitimate births is also 
partly attributable to a relational increase. The birth rate per 1,000 
for all unmarried women ages fifteen to forty-four increased from 
14.1 in 1950, to 26.4 in 1970, to 28.4 in 1980, and to 45.3 in 1993.216 
During the same time frame, the birth rate per 1,000 married wo-
men of the same age decreased substantially from 410.4 in 1950, to 
443.7 in 1970, to 350.0 in 1980, and to 388.0 in 1993.217 
These trends in the United States were similar to other indus-
trialized countries at the time excluding Asian countries. In fact, 
since 1970, Sweden and Denmark have experienced far greater in-
creases in rates of out-of-wedlock childbearing than has the United 
States.218 Not surprisingly, these trends have been accompanied by a 
dramatic increase in the rate of divorce during the same time 
frame. Although the number of divorces per 1,000 married women 
actually fell between 1950 and 1960, from approximately ten to 
eight divorces per 1,000 married women, subsequent to this time 
period the rate began a steady increase. 219 The divorce rate per 
1,000 married women was approximately fourteen in 1970 and 
twenty-three in 1980.220 Since 1980, however, the rate has fallen 
slightly to approximately twenty-one per 1,000 married women.221 
214. See REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 143. I have attempted to extract from 
graph form those numbers relevant to the time frame between the present 
and the time of the Cager decision. Figures describing a broader time frame 
reveal that between 1940 and 1993, the ratio of illegitimate to legitimate births 
increased from 38 per 1,000 births to 310 per 1,000 births. These figures illus-
trate an increase from less than 4% to more than 30%. See supra note 143. 
215. See REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 143, at 9 (noting that in 1980, the propor-
tion was approximately 20%). 
216. See id. at 88 tbl.I-2. 
217. See id. at 118 tbI.III-7. 
218. As of 1992, half of all births in Sweden were to unmarried women; in Den-
mark, 46% of all births were to unmarried women. See id. at 67. The United 
Kingdom and the United States were nearly identical in this respect, reporting 
31 % and 30% of all births to unmarried women, respectively. See id. France 
also reported 31 % of births out of wedlock. See id. Percentages for illegitimate 
childbearing for other industrialized nations were as follows: Canada 27%; 
Germany 15%; The Netherlands 13%; Italy 7%; and Japan 1 %. See id. 
219. See id. at 26. 
220. See id. 
221. See id. 
1997] Problems of Illegitimacy 161 
This decrease in the divorce rate between 1980 and 1993 may be a 
function of an overall dramatic decrease in marriage rates during 
this period. Between 1955 and 1993, the percentage of married men 
aged twenty to twenty-four years old fell from fIfty-one to eighteen 
percent, and the percentage of married men aged twenty-fIve to 
twenty-nine fell from seventy to forty-six percent.222 In those same 
years, the percentage of married women aged twenty to twenty-four 
fell from sixty-nine to thirty-two percent, and the percentage of mar-
ried women aged twenty-fIve to twenty-nine fell from eighty-six to 
fIfty-nine percent.223 
At the time of Gager, broad societal change was underway in 
which illegitimacy among the poor and welfare populations proved 
to be an exacerbated exception.224 Poverty, as well as the overall 
growth in AFDC participation since the 1960s, cannot be attributed 
to economic factors. The rate of illegitimate births and the propor-
tion of the population receiving AFDC began to increase dramati-
cally beginning in the 1960s and continued throughout the 1980s 
regardless of economic growth, without any apparent connection to 
larger economic trends.225 
222. See id. at 25. 
223. See id. (providing the percentages of unmarried individuals). 
224. See generaUy MURRAY, supra note 18, at 128, 130. Graphs illustrate that for all in-
come levels illegitimate childbearing and single female households markedly 
increased from 1960 to 1980-the poorer the group, the more rapid the in-
crease. Income status is a profound correlate to illegitimacy. Although race is 
a factor, it is much less correlative than income. See id. For a discussion of the 
way in which cultural and entitlement inducements to illegitimacy delivered a 
much greater impact among the poorer segments of the population, see id. at 
154, 178. 
225. See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, FAMILY AND NATION 22 (1986). Speaking of his 
experiences as an official in the Bureau of Labor Statistics during the Johnson 
Administration, Moynihan stated: 
[T] he number of new cases in postwar years rose and fell very much 
as unemployment rose and fell .... [There was a] remarkably strong 
correlation [] between unemployment and all manner of family dys-
function .... [A]s we moved from the late 1950s into the early 1960s 
the correlations weakened and then quite disappeared. . . . 
This came to be known as "the scissors." Plotted on a graph, the vari-
ous rates would go up and down as if chained together, but then the 
relation weakened, disappeared, and reappeared as its own opposite. 
Without exception the indicators of social stress- separation, wel-
fare-would now go up while the economic indicator-unemploy-
ment-would now go down. These patterns were to be found both 
for whites and blacks, most strongly for blacks. 
[d. at 22-23 (emphasis in original); see also MURRAY, supra note 18, at 58-68 (dis-
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As for Maryland, the Commission Report contained numerical 
data concerning illegitimacy and various presumptively related fac-
tors226 for each political subdivision of the state.227 At that time, ap-
cussing and dismissing various economic explanations for the emergence of 
categories of unemployment and welfare dependency beginning in the 1960s 
which, for the first time, were unresponsive to larger economic factors). 
226. See COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 9, apps. C & D at 131-65. Factors reported 
include race, political subdivision, age of mother, number of siblings, place of 
birth (in a hospital or not in a hospital), public assistance status, ages of sib-
lings, and number of different fathers per household with more than one ille-
gitimate child. See id. 
227. See id. at 108-09 for a tabular breakdown of illegitimate children in the ADC 
program for the 23 counties and Baltimore City, and the federal versus state 
costs borne by government on behalf of illegitimate children. The percentage 
of out of wedlock births comprised of all births in each political subdivision in 
1961 was determined to be as follows: 
Allegheny 2.24 
Anne Arundel 5.04 
Baltimore (County) 2.75 
Calvert 26.55 
Caroline 6.51 
Carroll 1.00 
Cecil 4.11 
Charles 13.71 
Dorchester 16.69 
Frederick 8.00 
Garrett 6.85 
Harford 6.85 
Howard 2.91 
Kent 12.57 
Montgomery 2.25 
Prince George's 3.94 
Queen Anne's 12.62 
St. Mary's 6.30 
Somerset 16.83 
Talbot 23.27 
Washington 5.56 
Wicomico 15.81 
Worcestor 24.88 
Baltimore City 17.55 
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proximately 8.9% of all births in Maryland were illegitimate. 228 
Among recipients of AFDC, the percentage of illegitimate births was 
approximately 34.1 %,229 nearly four times as frequent. 
It is not possible with today's data to precisely update the nu-
merical data assembled by the Commission. Nor is it clear that it 
would be interesting to do so because the data substantially consists 
of breakdowns by each county and Baltimore City by race and other 
factors. 23o If the principle driving force of increasing illegitimacy in 
the United States has been larger cultural changes throughout the 
industrialized world, then the important correlations to illegitimacy 
are not municipal or racial, rather they are cultural, historical, and 
behavioral. Nonetheless, the illegitimacy rate for Baltimore City at 
the time of the Commission's Report was 17.5%.23\ In 1980, the ille-
Id. at 132 tbl.I. 
228. The (projected) totals were as follows: 
> 74,610 births in 1961 
> 67,665 legitimate 
> 6,665 illegitimate 
COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 9, at 61-62, 132. 
These numbers were projected on the basis of actual data generated by 
the Committee concerning January and February of 1961. See id. Projections 
were based on an investigation of records over the preceding five years, which 
revealed that January and February births during that period represented on 
average 15.66% of annual births in Maryland. The actual totals for January 
and February of 1961, which formed the basis for these projections, were: 
> 11,658 births 
> 10,617 legitimate 
> 1,041 illegitimate 
Id. at 62, 136. 
Maryland birth records ceased to separately list illegitimacy as a reported 
attribute of newborns in 1938. See id. at 61. Data for January and February was 
specifically (and, one imagines, painstakingly) assembled by the staff of the 
Commission in conjunction with the State Department of Health and the Bal-
timore City Department of Health. See id. at 61. The criteria used to deter-
. mine illegitimacy were as follows: differing last name of father and mother; 
last name of child differing from last name of either the mother or father; the 
absence of a father's name altogether; and a mother listing herself as a "Miss" 
in themailingaddressshewasrequiredtoinscribeonthecertificate.Seeid.at 
62. 
229. See id. at 106-07. These statistics are as of December, 1958. This information 
was derived from unpublished research assembled by the State Department of 
Public Welfare prior to the formation of the Commission. See id. at 60. 
Z30. The report acknowledged two races-"White" and "non-White"- and applied 
these designations to virtually every other statistical category. See id. at 143, 
148, 154-55, 163-65. 
231. See COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 9, at 132. 
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gitimacy rate for Baltimore City was 56.5%,232 and in 1992 the rate 
was 60.8%.233 For Maryland as a whole, the illegitimacy rate was 
8.9% in 1961,234 25.1 % in 1980,235 and 32.4% in 1993.236 
The potential significance of this dramatic increase in overall il-
legitimacy, locally, nationally, and throughout much of the industri-
alized world, can be gleaned from the growing body of research 
that strongly points to severe long-term behavioral and psycho-social 
consequences for children growing up in single parent families, par-
ticularly those families headed by women who never have mar-
ried.237 As one commentator stated: 
From the wild Irish slums of the nineteenth century eastern 
seaboard, to the riot-torn suburbs of Los Angeles, there is 
one unmistakable lesson in American History:' a community 
that allows a large number of young men to grow up in 
broken families, dominated by women, never acquiring any 
stable relationship to male authority, never acquiring any 
rational set of expectations about the future-that commu-
nity asks for and gets chaos. Crime, violence, unrest, disor-
der-most particularly the furious, unrestrained lashing out 
at the whole social structure-that is not only to be ex-
pected; it is very near to inevitable. And it is richly 
232. See REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 143, at 106 tbl.I1-6 (22.9% among whites; 
74.2% among blacks). 
233. See id. Regarding racial breakdown, the 1992 numbers were 29.1 % for whites 
and 74.1 % for blacks. See id. 
234. See COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 9, at 132. This figure was derived based on 
the number of anticipated illegitimate births divided by the number of antici-
pated total births. 
235. See REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 143, at 104 tbl.I1-5. The figures were as 
follows: 11.4% among whites; 58.6% among blacks. See id. 
236. See id. Regarding racial breakdown, the 1993 numbers were 17.9% for whites 
and 61.9% for blacks. See id. 
237. According to a study by the Progressive Policy Institute, "[the] relationship be-
tween crime and one parent families [is] so strong that controlling for family 
configuration erases the relationship between race and crime and between low 
income and crime." ELAINE CIUlLA KAMARCK & WILLIAM A GALSTON. PUTTING 
CHILDREN FIRST: A PROGRESSIVE FAMILY POUCY FOR THE 1990s 14 (Sept. 1990); 
see also JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN. CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 
246-53 (1985). Additional research has revealed a profound correlation be-
tween fatherlessness and maladjustments such as poor school performance, 
poor health, emotional disorders, and serious difficulties with personal rela-
tionships. See Deborah A. Dawson, Family Structure and Well-Being: Data from the 
1988 National Health Interview Suroey on Child Health, 53]. MARRIAGE & FAM. 
573, 573-84 (1991). 
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deserved.238 
In light of subsequent developments, the conclusion is all but 
inescapable that the so called "enlightened" new way of thinking 
about welfare, illegitimacy, and the family that blossomed rather 
suddenly around the time Gager was decided, seems not to have 
been as enlightened or sophisticated as some confidently declared it 
to be.239 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For purposes of this Comment, it is ultimately of secondary im-
portance whether welfare programs have been a substantial driving 
force behind the phenomenal growth in illegitimacy in the past few 
generations. The paramount issue in this examination of Gager con-
cerns the proper source of guiding authority on matters of hroad 
social policy. Whether or not illegitimacy trends have been grossly 
exacerbated by a well-intentioned but unwise welfare system, the 
fact remains that the proper authority to address matters of child 
welfare in general and prospectively, and to form social policies 
which look to influence the future shape of society, resides with the 
legislature. The courts, despite their authority to determine the best 
interests of the child, and their broad discretion in that regard, are 
still confined to exercising judicial authority. Under no circum-
stances can the reasonable and legitimate exercise of such authority 
extend to redesigning welfare programs in clear contravention of 
the intentions of the legislature, or substituting one set of assump-
tions and objectives with another. Regardless of what the direction 
or driving force behind illegitimacy trends was when Gager was de-
cided, the legislature had spoken on the. issue and devised a means 
of remedying the condition of serial illegitimacy. Furthermore, Arti-
cle 26, Section 52 (f) was grounded in an exhaustive and systematic 
examination of illegitimacy carried out by a broad and diverse cross-
section of society.240 Finally, nothing in statutory or decisional au-
238. MOYNIHAN, supra note 225, at 9. 
239. As the majority stated in King, "[F] ederal public welfare policy now rests on a 
basis considerably more sophisticated and enlightened than the 'worthy-
person' concept of earlier times. State plans are now required to provide for a 
rehabilitative program of improving and correcting unsuitable homes." King v. 
Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 324-25 (1968). Sophisticated, enlightened rehabilitative 
programs that proceed hand-in-hand with a 300% increase in rates of illegiti-
mate childbearing and the virtual extinction of family structure among their 
target population make a strong case for crude, unenlightened social policies. 
240. See supra note 9. 
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thority presented valid obstacles to the vigorous enforcement of Sec-
tion 52(f). 
The ultimate issue which emerges from an examination of 
Gager is not whether the method of addressing illegitimacy provided 
for in Section 52(f) was the best means of addressing that problem, 
nor whether that approach had any merit at all. The decision of the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland in Gager represented a direct assault 
on the proper separation of powers. As such, the opinion consti-
tuted an affront to representative government itself. Those inclined 
to forgive such overreaching on grounds that the ends realized jus-
tifY the means used can find no basis for such a defense of Gager in 
the social developments in Maryland which followed that decision. 
Kevin Kendrick 
